Friday, May 15 2015 09:54

What are the expectations of Armenia and Azerbaijan from the EaP Summit in Riga given these countries’ foreign policy orientation?  

 

Considering the information, provided by the Riga Summit organizers, the event will cover the plans of cooperation of the EU with specific member-countries, among other issues. Actually, Brussels has internalized the Vilnius Summit lesson and its consequences, and now the European diplomacy agenda does not cover the issue on the agreement of the Eastern Partnership member-countries' forced Association with the EU. Individual partnership programs with every single country will probably be implemented.  The Plans will also consider the country's foreign policy course.  As for Azerbaijan, fuel-power and investment spheres are the highest priorities. This, however, does not mean that the agreement with Armenia will lack economic components and that with Azerbaijan - political ones.

 

The U.S. criticism of the situation in Azerbaijan, arrests of journalists and representatives of NGOs has increased comparing to 2014. What is behind that criticism? At least, the neighboring Armenia and Georgia are not criticized that harshly. 

 

I think, there is a certain answer in your question. Given USA's abstention from commenting on the situation in the neighboring countries, Washington's criticism on civil rights and freedoms in Azerbaijan is an excuse.  Neither the USA nor Europe considers Sahakashvili's imprisoned companions as political prisoners.  As for Armenia, foreign reports do not cover persecutions of journalists and NGO reps whose activity is officially supported. It would be easy to explain Washington's criticism against Azerbaijan by double standards. It is, however, obvious that this is about an undisguised political pressure, which implies willingness to control the political field of Azerbaijan.   Azerbaijan is the only country in the region to uphold neither proWestern nor proRussian foreign policy course. This situation is unacceptable for certain U.S. political quarters. These bodies press the point that Baku implicitly uphold the proWestern course  - this is fraught with grave aggravations of relations with both Russia and Iran - Azerbaijan's main regional partners and neighbors. Both Moscow and Tehran realize this quite well.  This is why their attitude towards Baku's distancing from the hostile behavior line is well-willed. In Wahsington, some representatives of the political establishment do not want to reckon with Azerbaijan’s interests, which leads to a conflict of interests.

 

 

Some experts say Azerbaijan-Russia relationships are warming as Washington seeks to change power in Baku. It would be interesting to learn the opinion of an Azerbaijani political scientist.  

 

Russia is one of the basic elements of Azerbaijan's foreign policy based on mutual interests. Moscow and Baku realize that any serious crisis in the Azeri-Russian relations will have irrecoverable consequences for both the two countries and the region in general. Today the matter concerns reformation of these relations rather than warming. For many years Azerbaijan has been insisting on relationship based on equal partnership with Russia. This scheme is being put into practice. In this light, the agreement on mutual protection of investments, partner agreements between Rosneft and SOCAR, as well as the multi-billion contracts with Rosoboronexport have been signed over the past 1-1.5 years. Over the same period, tangible progress has been reached in the talks on the political and legal status of the Caspian Sea.   Even Azerbaijan's strategy of the Southern Gas Corridor causes no discontent of Moscow the way it was a few years ago. The sides realize that their practical interests may be different, but there should be no strategic discrepancies. As for the U.S.  Senate's Amendment 907 on Azerbaijan, it seriously limits the trade and economic relations between the two countries.    

 

Do you see any objective preconditions for enhancement of Russia-Azerbaijan relationships?   

 

Azerbaijan and Russia have not only common interests but also risks vividly illustrated by the recent visit of Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolay Patrushev to Baku.  In this light, the growing threat of international terrorist structures such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, as well as the threat of destabilization of the political situation in the Caspian region, the prospect of destructive domestic political scenarios in Azerbaijan, is the unifier in the choice of the current priorities of the Azeri-Russian cooperation.

 

With their sanctions against Russia and the policy of restraint towards Turkey, the West and the U.S., inherently, push these countries closer to each other. What do you think of the current situation in the Russia-Turkey relations?  

 

Russian-Turkish relations are a sustainable direction of the regional policy. These relations are not that dependent on Western influence, however, they are quite dependent on Moscow and Ankara's views on regional political and economic security. Russia and Turkey's agenda divergences on Syria and Armenia can have a more serious impact on their cooperation rather than their contradictions with the West on Cyprus and Ukraine.  Up to now Ankara and Moscow were trying to avoid problematic issues on solving tasks of practical importance. However, Ankara has perceived Russian president V. Putin's recent visit to Armenia and his speech as a divergence from this practice - this has had an adverse impact on the Russian- Turkish relations. Time will show the further development of events. It is, however, already obvious that if Russia and Turkey keep avoiding such situations, they will have to synchronize real interests estimated by tens of billions of dollars with approaches towards regional policy issues. 

 

Some colleagues from Azerbaijan say the real opposition of Azerbaijan is in mosques now. What is the role of the Islamic factor in Azerbaijan and the Islamic State, at large?

 

To be more precise, radical Islamists and traditional Islamic values are almost incompatible. Those having radical views are most likely outside the mosques, because they are irreconcilable enemies of those committed to the standards and principles of behavior in traditional Islam. Though there is an Islamic factor in the Azeri policy, one should not exaggerate the role and significance of that factor. In the given case Azerbaijan has come across a rather strong external influence rather than influence of domestic processes. Most of Azerbaijanis are Shias, whereas the emissaries from abroad are trying to impose Salaphite ideas on the believers.  This is why this process is complicated in Azerbaijan, unlike other countries, where most of people are Sunnis. Moreover, most of the country's people are committed to secular standards. Therefore, they are irresponsive to the new trends. This is why the main burden of neutralizing the risks of the extremist religious sentiments lies on the law-enforcement structures and on the state committee dealing with the religious organizations. The local departments of the Caucasus Muslim Board and the religious activists seriously support them on-site. So, one cannot say that religious radicalism will become an essential factor in the domestic policy in Azerbaijan. 

 

It appears that Lausanne  agreements on Iran’s nuclear program,  which are yet to be finalized in June,  have brought  a new actor – Iran – to the global game. In this light, Russia’s decision to lift the ban on export of S-300 air defense systems to Iran shows that Moscow realizes all the nuances of the situation. What do you think of Tehran’s perspectives in the global and, which is more important, regional game?

 

Iran is a strong regional power under all circumstances and it is impossible to neglect this fact. If the sanctions against Iran are lifted, the country will retrieve the stage of development it experienced during Khatami's presidency. Actually, Rouhani continues Khatami's line with slight adjustments with due regard for the current reality. Within the next few years the domestic policy of Iran will undergo consistent liberalization in the regime. In the foreign policy Teheran will be striving to assert an independent line of conduct by resolving the current problems. The foreign policy will be based on Iran's own interests but will also take into account the interests of its foreign political partners, be it Western countries or Russia.

 

Contrary to the established opinion, Teheran is interested in partnership with Western countries because realpolitik dictates the need for cooperation. In the meantime, Russia, as a natural partner, is both a natural ally and a natural opponent for Iran in its relations with the West.