Wednesday, September 24 2014

Actually, the Wales meeting of the
Armenian and Azeri Presidents, which took place through the mediation and on
the initiative of the US Secretary of State, repeated the Sochi meeting of the
Presidents that was initiated by Russian President Vladimir Putin. In Wales
French President Francois Hollande announced the next Sargsyan-Aliyev meeting
in France. In this light, the analysts and experts say that the OSCE Minsk
Group Co-Chairs are now acting separately...

 

 I don’t think the Co-Chairs are acting without
coordination. The only thing one can say today is that the meetings in Sochi
and Wales were held without the Co-Chairs of the other states of the OSCE Minsk
Group. All the three Co-Chairs will be present at the upcoming meeting in
France, like at the planned meeting in New York. Now the Co-Chairs have quite
normal relations.  In the light of the
Ukrainian crisis, it is much easier for them to communicate and work at this
level rather than at the level of their countries' foreign ministers or
presidents. Nevertheless, I think, in the Karabakh peace process the common
interests of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries - the U.S., Russia, and
France - prevail over the existing discrepancies. 

 

Has the
Ukrainian crisis changed the interests and activity of the co-chairs?

  

Sure, the
Ukrainian crisis had bad consequences for the Karabakh
peace process. The degree of cynicism and frustration in the societies is too
high.  The old problems in the
post-Soviet space are not resolved. Moreover, new problems are being created
artificially. As a result, Azeris start thinking that the close Armenia-Russia
alliance strengthens the status quo around Nagorno-Karabakh, which is not
favorable for them. Therefore, the general background and the backwash of the
Ukrainian crisis in the conflicting countries have undoubtedly a negative
effect on the Co-Chairs’ activities.

 

Will the
Karabakh issue have any impact on the discussions on Armenia’s accession to the
EEU that are scheduled for 10 October in Minsk? Will Armenia’s accession to the
EEU give a new impetus to the Karabakh peace process?

 

Armenia has long ago chosen the Eurasian vector in its
foreign policy as a pre-determining one. 
However, there are viewpoints according to which the structure of the
Eurasian Union is hardly legally capable. For this reason, I don’t think that
the Karabakh settlement will gain a new stimulus if Armenia joins the Eurasian
Union. The "Customs three" will also discuss nothing new on 10
October in Minsk on the matter of Armenia's joining the EEU. An attempt of
simultaneous game of Moscow with Yerevan and Baku does not add prospects to the
Karabakh settlement.

 

 How long will that game continue?

 

Such a game will last as long as Russia is interested
in it. As for Armenia and Azerbaijan, they are no longer the weak states of the
90s, but more consolidated and quite normal states able to protect their own
interests.

 

How much do the lack of democracy in
Azerbaijan and the very doubtful democracy in Armenia hamper the NK conflict's
resolution?

 

 A bounded group of top-ranking officials in Azerbaijan
and Armenia are monopolistically engaged in the Nagorno Karabakh peace process,
which, indeed, hampers the conflict's final resolution. Top echelons of power
do not allow the two publics to discuss the conflict and its settlement-schemes
normally and dynamically. These people successfully preserve the conflict
hindering normal development of societies in both the countries and the
opportunities to discuss it more liberally. However, there is danger also in
the incremental democracy in Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this case, radical
patriotic forces may come in power on the wave of democratization and they may demand
a revenge and settlement of the conflict by force.

 

In this light, transition to the genuine democracy may
not be painless for the parties to the Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, it may
become a catalyst of the conflict's resolution. 
Meanwhile, in the short-term outlook, the democratization is fraught
with big dangers, as it may unfreeze the conflict.

  

You have
mentioned that our authorities preserve the NK conflict. So, what settlement we
talk about?

 

It is a
very interesting question. I have been asked about it for the past 20 years. In
the light of no external impacts on settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the
authorities of both the countries are quite happy with the status-quo. The
paradox of the situation around the Karabakh conflict is that its settlement
has not much limited the ways of external pressure upon the leadership in
Yerevan and Baku.

 

  The
Karabakh conflict’s resolution would tangibly restrict the instruments of
external pressure on the leadership of Yerevan and Baku. A good motivation,
isn’t it?

 

Armenia and Azerbaijan have been still living in the
epoch of nationalism and national building, in the 80-s of the past
century.  This strongly seats in the
brains of the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, but there is no modern strategic thinking
about the true needs of Armenia and Azerbaijan. There are too much bloodshed,
emotions and nationalism, that dominate over the logic and impartiality. It is
hard to get rid of the war experience. The society and power in Armenia and
Azerbaijan are strongly linked by a vicious circle.

 

 Will
Karabakh’s involvement in the peace process catalyze the conflict’s resolution?

  

Unfortunately the parties to the conflict have not yet
reached such a level. In this context, I think, participation of the NKR President
Bako Sahakyan in the talks, at least at present, will not bring any new and
useful initiatives for settlement of the conflict.  Nevertheless, I am absolutely confident that
at a certain moment participation of the people of Nagornyy Karabakh in formation
of their own future and destiny will become inevitable.