Friday, July 29 2016 06:35

 What events outside the region did catalyze the April War?

 

April war has become possible due to the irresponsibility of the OSCE Minsk Group mediators. 

Since August of 2014, the OSCE Minsk Group has done almost nothing to prevent numerous violations of the ceasefire by the sides. No serious discussions were held to prevent such violations, which sparked unprecedented ceasefire violations in April. I can say that the mediators used the April escalation for their own purposes. Azerbaijan did not anticipate any breakthroughs in the negotiation process after the April war. Nor had they expected so many casualties on both sides. I’d not say that in Azerbaijan they do not analyze the April war seriously. Meantime, even the authorities of Azerbaijan could not anticipate the euphoria there was in public on the first days of April. This is what stopped the war as quickly as it started.

 

What do you think about the interests of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia when on April 5 in Moscow they made an arrangement to resume the ceasefire of 1994?

 

It is natural that any changes on the Line of Contact are not in favor of Armenia. Meantime, changes on both the Line of Contact and the peace process are in favor of Azerbaijan, of course. In April, Azerbaijan once again declared that the status quo in Karabakh is inadmissible for it. Having a great influence on Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russia in turn made clear that the two countries cannot make any independent steps without reckoning with its special opinion. The mediating power and the political role of Russia in the Karabakh conflict is great, and the other mediator countries admit that fact. In this sense, Moscow was interested in demonstrating Armenia's high dependence on Russia, changing Azerbaijan's foreign policy vector and bringing Azerbaijan closer to the Eurasian Economic Union. In April, Moscow got a brilliant chance to make the conflicting sides to think of this all.

 

Is Azerbaijan ready now to start moving towards integration with the Eurasian Economic Union?   

I am not sure that Azerbaijan will even join the EEU. However, it will inevitably cooperate with the Customs Union and even the Eurasian Union on the example of its cooperation with the European Union. I think in Azerbaijan they began to think seriously about the need to establish economic relations with the EEU. After all, Baku has understood that that it should not ignore EEU.

 

   We can say the negotiation process has been intensified certainly and the status quo was broken after the April war – something Azerbaijan has been seeking for a long time already. At the same time, the public sentiments over the prospects of the conflict’s settlement on the basis of bilateral concessions have radicalized too. Actually, we have faced a paradoxical situation - optimism of Moscow and the mediators amid uncompromising pessimism of the Armenian people. The reason is the April war with its aftermaths: casualties, the cut ears, and beheaded soldiers…In other words, the April war did not catalyze the talks and even had a reverse effect. Was it a deliberate policy of Azerbaijan or they miscounted it?

Before the April war there was a real chance to influence the Armenian public to make it agree on mutual concessions, but after the April war, there is no chance to do it.  In Armenia and Karabakh the publics have radicalized. Therefore, it is senseless speaking of the readiness of Armenians to go on any concessions to achieve settlement of the conflict. Yet, there are certain breakthroughs in the peace process, as Russia seeks to prove the sides its irreplaceably and influence. 

 

Do you think Russia seeks to prove that to the two sides only?

In fact, Moscow’s message was really addressed to European institutions and the West generally. It is very important for Russia to show the world that it is able to make peace and war in the region at any moment by influencing the sides to the Karabakh conflict.  It is very important for Moscow to show the world that it is able to moderate the conflict not only by selling weapons to the conflicting sides, but also by its peacemaking potential. Actually, Armenia and Azerbaijan have serious thoughts about whether Russia wants to settle the conflict.  Russia is a mediator that openly demonstrates its own interests in the process. Unlike U.S. and France, Russia is not going to refuse from the Caucasus that is of vital important for it. Russia is part of that region and the sides understand each other better through Russia’s mediation rather than through mediation of the OSCE. That is why Russia will be present in the Karabakh conflict for a long time despite its doubtful role in it.

 Do you think that Russia’s major goal is to deploy peacekeepers in Karabakh and get a full control of the conflict? What does Azerbaijan think of such prospects?

 

Despite its big power, Russia has limited capacities, considering that it is not the only mediator in the Karabakh peace process. Yet, Moscow does not pursue sooner settlement of the conflict even if its interests are observed in the process.

If the Kremlin could get what it wants from concessions by the parties to the Karabakh conflict, it would drive them to the negotiating table and launch the peace process.  So far, Russia and Putin personally have no such plans. Instead, they have a goal to achieve the consent of the conflicting sides to the deployment of peacekeepers, even if these are not only Russian ones. Moscow welcomes any peacekeepers, as this will ensure the status quo for years to come.

 

 

Is it its major goal?

 

Well, Russia has no strict action plan on Karabakh. It just seeks to maintain the status quo, while the other mediators - the U.S. and France are keen to achieve a solution admissible to both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. To settle the conflict by common consent is possible, if Russia is left out of the process. That is why Moscow artificially extends the status quo. The negative experience of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is enough for Azerbaijan to understand that deployment of peacekeepers in Karabakh may gradually transform the peacekeepers into occupants. Therefore, Azerbaijan opposes the idea extremely, though there are other examples too, for instance Srebrenica. Any normal country must rely on its own army only. I think deployment of peacekeepers in the Karabakh is impossible in the current negotiation format. OSCE is simply not able to do it. If the EU tackles the conflict, establishment of a fixed contingent of peacekeepers may become possible in future.

 

Could you assess Turkey’s influence on Azerbaijan? How will the recent events in Turkey affect its relations with Azerbaijan?

There are illusions that Azerbaijan is under big influence of Turkey. There is no influence as such.  Ilham Aliyev is committed to the only possible foreign policy line towards Turkey – a really powerful partner of Azerbaijan in the foreign policy. This does not mean however that the relations of our countries are as perfect as it may seem. I can say that when the Zurich protocols of the Armenian-Turkish normalization were discussed, it was Baku that influenced Ankara.

 

Tail wagging the dog?

Well, this is so, I think. It is undisputable that Azerbaijan is rather a favorable trade and economic partner for Turkey, a source of its transit projects. At the same time, Turkey does not consider Azerbaijan as the supporter of its global policy without reckoning with its interests. I think the recent events in Turkey will in no way affect the relations with Azerbaijan. Our relations do not depend on the leaders only. The Azerbaijani and Turkish politicians can agree upon their actions in any format.