Wednesday, August 17 2016 02:13

It appears that the Russian president's meetings with his Azerbaijani and Armenian counterparts on August 8 and 10 speak about Moscow’s leadership in the Karabakh peace process, amid widely rumored plans of Moscow to launch an active phase of the conflict’s resolution through ceding of 5 regions of Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan. What do you think of the so-called Putin’s Plan?

I do not understand the rumors about 'Moscow's final achievement of leadership in the intermediary mission in the Karabakh conflict settlement'. What went wrong with that 'leadership' if Moscow had to reinforce it on August 8 and 10? What demonstrated that Yerevan and Baku question Moscow's leadership?  The core of the recent meetings and talks - as observed in the behavior of the heads of the conflicting states - is the Moscow has apparently decided to refresh the form of its 'leadership in the intermediary mission' without changing its core. I think that 25 years is a sufficient period of time for the 'international community' to start slandering about the low efficiency of 'the leader of the intermediary mission'. The Kremlin PR experts in conflict studies have informed their leader of this probability and have suggested changing something. No one, except the presidents and the foreign ministers, knows for sure what this specifically means. I am convinced that Moscow will do its best to strengthen the mechanism of its own control over the conflicting states. The recent developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan have demonstrated that the mass insanity in the matter of Karabakh has grown so much that it allows doing anything with the rabble.

 

Some of you colleagues have already presented the outcomes of Vladimir Putin’s talks with his Iranian, Turkish, and Azerbaijani counterparts on August 8,9, and 10 as a birth of a new coalition Moscow-Tehran-Ankara-Damascus-Baku. Don’t you think that with the strategic retreat of U.S. and the countries of the Persian Gulf and the creation of such coalition, the balance of forces in the Greater Middle East will change fundamentally in its favor?

The Moscow-Tehran-Ankara-Damascus-Baku coalition does not exist. Nor is it in view.   The balance of forces in the Greater Middle East cannot change in favor of the mythical coalition, because the real strength of the United States and its allies is much bigger than the potential of any 'coalition'. The thing is that when the West starts moving like a bear in a china shop, in the Muslim world such countries as Iran, Turkey and Russia are trying to minimize their losses all by themselves or with joint efforts within a coalition.      

 

After the regular meeting of the Russian president with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, President of France Francois Hollande expressed readiness to organize a similar meeting. Russia’s positive response to such initiative at first sight speaks of the coordinated actions of at least two of the three co-chair-countries of the OSCE MG. All this is happening amid the West’s continuous steps to isolate Russia. What do you think about all this?

As for the coordinated actions of at least two out of the three co-chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group - France and Russia - amid the continuous isolation of Russia by the West, in addition to the 'isolation', locking horns with Ukraine and Syria, there are also issues, in which the interests of Russia, France and the United States totally coincide. First of all, this concerns the Karabakh problem.  This problem gives all the three countries an incredibly effective tool to influence the region.  One of the co-chairs used, abused, and refused. Now another 'peacemaker' is coming in. All of them campaign for peace, all of them advocate settling the problem by peaceful means…At the same time, all of them are afraid that at some point Armenians and Azerbaijanis can quit the enmity and intolerance, and can come to an agreement, being guided by the people's interests, not by the territory.

Was the April flare-up in Karabakh one of the mechanisms to promote Moscow’s interests in the South Caucasus and beyond it? Have the leaderships of Armenia and Azerbaijan benefited from it?

Sure, the April war became an entree to the so-called strengthening of Russia's leadership in the intermediary mission. It was the April escalation that has become one of the mechanisms for promoting Moscow's interests in the South Caucasus and far beyond its boundaries. Has it brought any benefits to Armenia and Azerbaijan, besides human and material losses? I think the question sounds like a rhetorical one. The fact that young Armenians and Azeris were killed means that you can't make an omelet without breaking the egg.

 

It appears that Azerbaijan will have to somehow pay for the positions of the Karabakh army it “obtained” in April. Was its participation in the new North-South axis with Russia and Iran a payment for those positions? 

In order to enumerate all that Armenia and Azerbaijan paid for the "losses" and "gains" during the Karabakh conflict, I would have to refer to all that has been written over the past 28 years. Suffice it to say that Armenia and Azerbaijan have lost their sovereignty and have turned into obedient vassals of Russia. As for Azerbaijan's participation in formation of the new North-South axis together with Russia and Iran, this is first of all an economic project that promises big money to the overspent regime. Earlier this corridor "was banned" by Washington, but now the ban has been lifted and the business is about to begin. The transport corridor is not at all directed against Turkish interests. Turkey can join the project and start gaining money from expansion of international trade if it wants.