Friday, August 12 2016 03:37

Ani Research Center has publicized the so-called "Putin plan" on the Karabakh conflict settlement, citing its own diplomatic sources. The proposals are close to the phase-to-phase version of 1997 and include two major packages: 1) Armenian forces are withdrawn from 5 districts, namely Aghdam, Fizuli, Jabrail, Zangelan, Kubatlu; 2) Karabakh receives an interim status that implies no return to Azerbaijan. A referendum on the exercise of Karabakh people's right to self-determination, which is stipulated in the Madrid and Kazan documents, is postponed for an uncertain period. I’d like to listen to you opinion about the given article?

 

Such talks have always existed, with its certain components becoming topical or disappearing every now and then. Naturally, it has become clear to everyone after the April war that the relevance of the Karabakh problem and the diplomatic fuss around it have sharply intensified. However, I think this does not demonstrate that the Karabakh conflict is being resolved. It shows that the Karabakh peace process is being used for promoting the political interests of a number of countries.  Actually, today we see it through the example of Russia-West relations. The matter concerns Georgia, Ukraine, the collapse of Eastern Partnership, Crimea, Russia's isolation, its entry into Syria, and the instant conflict with Turkey. Now we see the Karabakh situation and the new positions being built around it. I consider all these "plans" and proposals through the given prism. The high level of significance of the April war was expressed in the reaction of the UN Secretary General, other international organizations and other power centers.  It is also clear that even a slight escalation of the Karabakh conflict is able to resolve quite big problems.

Could you say a little bit more about your last phrase, please? 

The first thing that caught the eye right after the April war was the meeting of the Russian, Iranian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers that marked the beginning of a new line of formation of strategic relations.  Now, in August, we see its continuation at the level of presidents and it will most likely end in important decisions. I think this line was skillfully formed against the background of the April war, however, the existing decisions might also have contributed to creation of that line. Another clear thing is the attempt to build new relations between Russia and somewhat different Turkey, which experienced a coup attempt and found itself in a very difficult situation - deterioration of its relations with the West. The peak of the deterioration, Sargsyan says, was Germany's recognition of the Armenian Genocide, which forced Erdogan to look towards Russia again.  The situation around Turkey is totally different than half a year ago. In this situation, each country will be promoting its own interests. The schedule of the August 8-10 meetings of Putin, Rouhani, Aliyev, Erdogan and Sargsyan makes it clear that Russia plays the key role in the region, promoting its own projects as the basis of formation of new relations. The first thing that catches our eye is that Moscow is trying to make Azerbaijan totally dependent on Russia by working out a strategic line that will allow keeping Azerbaijan away from Turkey, because the Baku-Ankara tandem is a source of very big problems for Moscow. I think, Russia will eventually get what it seeks to get.

Turkey’s weakening…

The current reality is that Turkey has weakened so much that it asks Russia for partnership on new terms.  Turkey has never done it before. Now Moscow will be talking to Ankara based on the trilateral union with Iran and Azerbaijan, and after that it will talk to Armenia based on the results of all these meetings. The situation around Karabakh amid all foreign political collisions remains rather complicated. Karabakh - as the geo-strategic mechanism of Armenian policy and Armenian factor - is certainly the most effective mechanism of Russia's policy in its talk with the Turkic elements inside and outside the country. Russia simply lacks a more effective mechanism to improve its relations with those countries. It is natural that all those countries are exerting strong pressure on both Armenia and Russia. Hence, Moscow's attempts to maneuver and please all those entities at the expense of Armenia’s interests. At the same time, Moscow does not want the Armenian geo-strategic mechanism to be damaged significantly, because it has no other mechanism. In this light, the roots of numerous projects on cession of the Artsakh territories are here.  No one will be able to tell the bluff from the real demands and proposals. 

Well, but if the 5 regions are ceded to Azerbaijan with the participation of Russia, this will affect, first of all, Russia, or what you have called a geo-strategic mechanism of restraining the Turkic world. This will give a good chance for Baku to settle the problem with the Karabakh Armenians on its own, from more favorable positions and without reference to Moscow.

 

Sure, that is why Moscow will not give Baku such chances. Why for? Russia’s fundamental problem is not its relations with the West, but the ones with the Turkic-speaking element of the world. This is a very difficult task for such a big country like Russia that is experiencing technological lag and political disorganization. Russia has no ready solution for such problems. Therefore, Moscow has to resort to situation-driven bluff more and more frequently. While the oil prices were high and Turkey was standing strongly on his feet, Azerbaijan was behaving rather confidently and even dissolutely in its relations with both Russia and the West. However, what has happened to oil prices and Turkey made Azerbaijan think seriously over the effect of its bluff and limit it seriously to shift to realpolitik. This has made it demand Russia not to sell weapons to Armenia. For the first time Baku saw how its political resources are turning inefficient. Such situation has made Azerbaijan agree on the Russian-Iranian ‘kabala’ – something it would never agree to in other situation – and neglect Turkey’s interests. A new situation has emerged and Armenia can now take a tougher position towards Azerbaijan, because the pressure of Azerbaijan and Turkey on Russia has weakened dramatically. In this new situation, Armenia has big opportunities to revise some of its commitments to Russia. However, I do not know if the authorities of Armenia will be able ever to abandon their 25-year-old policy of selling positions for guarantees of their personal security. One of the Russian experts has once said quite fairly: “Russia takes as much from other countries as they let it take.” It does not need more. I am speaking about both Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

What does the riot by Sasna Tsrer mean to you, personally?

It was an element from the cycle of problems I have mentioned above. It must not be considered separately, I think. An insight will let specify it as continuation of the April war phenomenon. Everything started with Jirayr Sefilyan’s accusations against Serzh Sargsyan.  It were accusations of deadly sin – sale of the positions lost in April, formation of forces to bring back those sold positions etc. All this specifics have resulted in a complicated situation and, eventually, in Serzh Sargsyan’s decision to arrest Sefilyan. 

 A deliberate neutralization…

Only Sargsyan knows the answer to this question. It is clear to everyone that he sought to use that in foreign policy. The day of Sefilyan’s arrest coincided with the St. Petersburg meeting of Sargsyan with Putin and Aliyev. It is hard to say if there was anything else behind that decision, but Sefilyan’s arrest is what sparked the July unrest. Karabakh War heroes came out against Sargsyan. These were the people that demonstrated readiness for self-sacrifice, an ability not to target the people targeting them. It is a very complicated situation irrespective of whether Sargsyan sought to use it in foreign policy or not. The July riot has changed the situation in Armenia, as politically aware fighters entered the Armenian political field. U.S. and Europe characterized the new situation in Armenia as a political process aimed at changes, while the Armenian authorities were trying to call it terrorism. In other words, Sasna Tsrer movement has got certain recognition in the world. I do not know, if it was a surprise for Serzh Sargsyan or not, but when politically literate fighters ready for self-sacrifice entered the political arena, it led to fundamental changes in many countries.

Nevertheless, did Serzh Sargsyan receive any preferences in the issue of the territories around Karabakh from that fortnight of confrontation?

I do not know what the problem of territories means for Serzh Sargsyan personally. Many and Jirayr Sefilyan among them think it is just business for the president. It is not clear if he is in fact demanded to cede those territories, or it is his personal initiative. At least, the April war made it clear that, in fact, no one has ever demanded anything from Serzh Sargsyan. As for setting these territories to auction, he could do it, considering that he is a bright representative of oligarchy, comprador bourgeoisie, addicted to selling everything possible. That is why Sasna Tsrer’s attempt to undermine his business was an unpleasant surprise for the president.  

It appears that Azerbaijan will have to somehow pay for the positions of the Karabakh army it “obtained” in April. Was its participation in the new North-South axis with Russia and Iran a payment for those positions? 

I do not think that Azerbaijan will have to make any serious commitments. Is there anything bad in a new, powerful strategic line of economic relations? There are many components that will benefit not only Iran and Russia, but also Azerbaijan. The question is if this meets Baku’s strategic interests, which Azerbaijan still sees in the cooperation with Turkey. Azerbaijan is not going to refuse from it anyway. Here, Baku loses, as it can do nothing. The Armenian factor in the hands of Russia works not only as ‘a desirable piece of the cake’ but also as a real threat that may hit at any moment. Everyone understands this now. 

Let us draw conclusion from the abovementioned. Should we expect another flare up in Karabakh considering the ongoing geopolitical shifts in the region or what we see now are just political and economic efforts to nail down the results of the military conflict?

Karabakh will be used as ‘desirable piece of the cake’ as long as the Armenian policy allows this. Armenia can put an end to such practice by building fundamentally new relations with all the actors in the region. So, the talks about ceding of the 5 regions are just talks. In fact, this is very expensive ‘product’ that is sold by others for some unknown reasons. Some in Armenia think that if we cede some territories, we will get everyone off our back. This is a fundamentally wrong opinion. If we cede the territories, they will want something else. Therefore, Armenia must refuse from the role that is forced upon it and stop trying to get rid of it by tearing out a piece of itself. The political romantics will gradually fade into insignificance and people will start comprehending that relations are built on quite different schemes. As long as Armenia’s policy is to trade in its own rights,  Karabakh will be a desirable piece of the cake in the hand of Russia.

Are the developments around Sasna Tsrer movement able to change the course of events?

Sure. Within 25 years 99% of the people engaged in political field in Armenia had a similar psychology and political outlook. Now, we can see people with quite different political outlook, people who set alternative tasks. Now, everything depends on whether these people, who are in jail now, will manage to turn their political outlook into a political program.  Anyway, there are facts that really matter, for instance, these people call themselves political prisoners and they did not target the people who targeted them. This is a display of political approach, I think.