Thursday, November 27 2014

Mr.
Krylov, could you share your vision of why Baku ordered to shot down the
Armenian helicopter Mi-24 flying along the perimeter of the
Karabakh-Azerbaijuani border on 12 November? Obviously, that order ran contrary
to Aliyev’s promises in Sochi, Newport and Paris. What impulses may it give to
the Minsk process?   

 

Baku was unlikely to give an order to shoot down that
very helicopter. The request about the order and the response would have taken
too much time. The downed Armenian helicopter is the result of the situation
that has been present on the Line of Contact for many years due to Baku's
policy. That policy is aimed at gaining revenge and retrieving the
"occupied" territories by means of pressuring Armenia. Regular
escalation on the Line of Contact is an integral part of that pressure. In the
meantime, the conflict zone tends to be geographically expanding and the number
of large-scale armed incidents is growing. That is to say, Baku is striving to
intensify that type of pressure of Armenia. The military balance in the region
makes the defeat of Armenia by the Azeri army impossible and Armenia's CSTO
membership also makes Turkey's military intervention impossible.  Therefore, each escalation is followed by a
pause with ritual promises, high-level meetings, co-chairs' statements, etc.
Despites this, the key task of Baku will remain the same. In the meantime, Baku
is sure that it will be able to keep the situation "on the verge" and
to prevent resumption of armed hostilities, whose consequences may prove
unfavorable for Azerbaijan.

 

In this light, one can expect the policy of Armenia's
exhaustion to continue. The pause will be followed by new escalation and new
incidents. The situation is unlikely to change until a number of significant
changes occur in Azerbaijan, Armenia or in the region in general.  

 

 

On 22 November, Ukraine's President
Petro Poroshenko and US Vice President Joseph Biden said they view the Minsk
format (Ukraine,Russia, OSCE) of negotiations on resolving the Donbass problem
as the most acceptable one. Actually, the United States refused to participate
in the Ukraine's crisis management. This made some experts speak of
Washington's certain loyalty to Moscow. 
What will be the price of such loyalty?

 

Washington shows no 'loyalty' to Moscow.  Consequently, the talks about the 'price' of
that 'loyalty' are idle. The United States is waging its own policy in Ukraine
and will not bind itself by joining any format on settlement of Ukraine's
crisis.  This is the key answer to the
question about the reasons of that loyalty. They just used Ukraine to exert
pressure on Russia, like they once used Georgia. If the problem is settled
peacefully, the White House will lose the instruments of pressure on Russia it
has created. Consequently, the U.S. seeks to expand the conflict with a war
'till the last Ukrainian' and its possible spillover to the territory of
Russia. Such prospects are very dangerous not only for Russia, but also for the
EU countries, as this may increase discrepancies between the U.S. and the EU
and inside the EU. 

 

 

The
latest large-scale geopolitical shifts – Ukraine and others – have created a
quite good starting position for Iran to activate its foreign policy. What are
the prospects of Iran’s policy in the South Caucasus, in this light?

 

 

I don't share the optimism about the efforts of Iran,
U.S. and the European Union towards settlement of the nuclear problem. The
U.S.  and Israel still consider Iran as
one of the major threats.  Meanwhile,
Iran is not among the countries that are ready to refuse from their independent
policy in exchange for American friendship promises. Consequently, Tehran does
not seem to think of curbing its nuclear work and its relations with the United
States and Israel will remain tense. The situation is becoming more acute as
Iran's neighbors India and Pakistan have already had nuclear weapons, which
increases the concerns of the U.S. and Israel over possible development of
Iran's nuclear program. 

 

 

Are you
concerned over the latest ‘success’ of the ISIL in the Middle East amid the
ongoing destabilization in the North Caucasus? 
Do you see any preconditions for the Islamic Sate to fulfill its threats
to Russia?

 

The name
ISIL is outdated. In summer, hey announced establishment of the Islamic
caliphate on the territories under control of ISIL militants. Afterwards, ISIL
was renamed into the Islamic State (IS). It was not just renaming. It means
that they not just seek to reorganize Syria and the neighbor-states, but build
a global Islamic state. The areas in neighborhood will become the objects of
IS’s next steps. Obviously, the entire Caucasus, as well as Africa, Europe,
USA, Asia, and then the entire world will occur in the focus of attention of
the IS.

 

Ruling
regime in Azerbaijan is actively fighting any displays of Islam in that
country. Are Baku’s fears that radical Islam penetrates to Azerbaijan from Iran
grounded? 

 

 

Radical
Islam came to Azerbaijan not from the Shia Iran, but from the Sunni countries
that have been confronting with it for centuries. The problems in the relations
of Iran and Azerbaijan are not of religious nature. They have political and
economic reasons (Southern Azerbaijan, Caspian region etc.). The influence of
the Islamic State idea is growing in Azerbaijan, and it is quite possible that
the efforts to turn Azerbaijan part of the global caliphate will be
intensified. During the last years, the Azerbaijani authorities have taken ore
effective measures against dissemination of radical ideas and literature, to
control the activity of preachers from other countries etc. This means that the
Azerbaijani authorities consider the Islamic State and its local supporters as
a real threat to the national security of Azerbaijan.