When speaking of the Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation, most people in Armenia understand the multi-billion-worth agreements that the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence has signed with the “Rosoboronexport”. Meanwhile, this partnership is based on the investment treaties between “Rosneft” and SOCAR.
Since the first years of its independence, Azerbaijan has billed itself as a pro-Western country developing rather an adjusted foreign policy. I would say that Azerbaijan has gradually become Armenized, as its policy has gradually become complementary. It has become evident during the last years when Baku tried to find a golden mean between the West and Russia. In opposition to the relations with Iran - Baku is very much concerned over these relationships - Azerbaijan hypes its relations with Israel. Given its problems with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan's situation is little better than that of Armenia. Azerbaijan would be a different country, but for its energy resources that enable it to keep certain neutrality. Therefore, Azerbaijan has never launched any process similar to the Association Agreement with the EU inside the Eastern Partnership (EaP) unlike other 4 EaP countries. Baku like Minsk is well aware that such association will make them more dependence on the West and they will face the talks on human rights and other disgraceful things. Naturally, Azerbaijan does not need to anger Russia either, especially after it rejected Moscow's explicit offer to join the Customs Union yet before Armenia.
How then explain the arrests and persecutions against the pro-Western sector of the Azerbaijani media and NGOs, as well as the United States' strong criticism against Baku?
With the assertion of the ruling regime. From the political perspective, Azerbaijan ceased to be a South Caucasus country and became a Central Asian country long ago. It is a typical petrostate whose only difference from the Central Asian states is that it went through no revolution. I believe that Azerbaijan is turning into a typical Middle East state. The country gradually resembles Egypt of the Mubarak period. These are internal processes though they affect Azerbaijan's image on the international arena. The West warns Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, etc. that it will deprive them of preferences and investments if they fail to conduct relevant reforms in some fields. Therefore, the West logically uses the fact that these countries need the West's money. In the meantime, Azerbaijan needs no money from the West. Moreover, Azerbaijan itself is ready to launch financial programs and to give grants to Europe for erecting a Heydar Aliyev monument in a European village.
Is there any external force or a body of forceses that can remove Aliyev from the helm of the state?
Only a very sharp decline in oil prices can remove Ilham Aliyev from the power. An economic collapse in Azerbaijan may trigger political radical Islamic sentiments, which can seriously threaten the regime. However, it is rather hard to imagine such a decline in the oil prices today.
The annihilation of the secular opposition has resulted in the forthcoming and strengthening of religious opposition in Azerbaijan. How can this end up for Azerbaijan?
Mosque is the only place in Azerbaijan where people can talk. Platforms such as Internet, press and politics have been thoroughly cleaned up. This movement speaks its mind intra muros of mosques. Having nowhere else to go, secular people attend mosques with the purpose of talking. This is the very factor that politicizes the Islamisation in the neighbouring country turning the Shia Azerbiajan into Sunni
Meaning, there is not much in common with Iran?
There is nothing in common. Shia Islam is particularly taking roots in the South of Azerbaijan. The Sunni course and its several sources cause the politicization of Islam. This first of all refers to North Caucasian Islam that emanates from the peoples dwelling in the north of the country. Secondly, Azerbaijan has a generation that attended Turkish schools (most often Nursist ones), a generation that grew to Turkish TV. Thirdly, Arabic countries directly fund some Salafist projects in Azerbaijan. All of this causes serious changes in the Azerbaijani Islam. Islam is the first threat for the Azerbaijani government. Baku is raising a homunculus thorough the fight against this threat. This will sooner or later play its role. In countries like Egypt such a situation can last for decades. Given the lack of sociology in Azerbaijan, external powers consider this situation in the country rather negatively.
Western sanctions against Russia, as well the same Western policy of deterrence against Turkish ambitions have brought these two countries together making them allies. Do you think West has calculated these two vectors of its policy?
In my opinion, the West could have misestimated these vectors the way it has misestimated the Middle Eastern policy toward Libya, Iraq, Turkey, ISIS over the past decade. In the light of these facts they can misestimate anything. Given the recently degraded Western policy in respect of taking decisions toward Middle East, I am sometimes surprised to see them estimating something correctly. Taking into account Russia and Turkey's problems with the West, the alliance of convenience between these two countries seems quite logical and rational. The alliance of completely different Turkey and Israel during the Cold War is a similar example. They were united by the fact of being NATO outposts. The change in the situation and Turkey's wish to independently act in the Middle East resulted in the specially planned bedlam of the Turkish-Israeli relations. The reason for this was that Turkey needed to seem anti-Semitic for acting like that in the Middle East. Therefore, Russia needs Turkey and Turkey needs Russia for the contradiction games with the West. However, Europe is the only counteractant in this game. In other words, Russia has no chance to threaten Europe through Ukraine and Bulgaria, so it tries to use China, Turkey, BRICS at the same time working for Europe. That is why the Moscow-Ankara alliance is of convenience - these two rivals have too many contradictions in reality.
You have mentioned Europe as the Russia’s prize. There is an opinion in Armenia that Nagorno-Karabakh can become the Turkish prize in the Russian-Turkish games…
This fully meets with the Armenian exotic perception of the outside world. Russia's need of acting in the post-Soviet territory is behind Russia's real stance on South Caucasus. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia is no longer a universal power, however, it still remains a regional one. Almost all scenarios in respect of Russia - Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Donbass and Belarus are related to the fight for proving "who wears the pants". Interests of Russia matter in the South Caucasus - Russia plays a role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for it enhances Karabakh's security. If Karabakh conflict is settled Russia will disappear from the region for no one will need it anymore. There are no idiots in Moscow to "present" Karabakh to Turkey and then leave South Caucasus for good. Why? This is not serious. Russia will not "present" Karabakh to Turkey or Azerbaijan for its love for its century- long ally Armenia, but for the lack of well-minded reasons for acting that way. Russia needs neither shootings on the border, nor peace or war; all Russia needs is the status quo. If there is status quo, both Armenia and Azerbaijan will need Russia to provide safety.
It seems that the to-be endorsed in June Lausanne agreements on Iran’s nuclear programme have resulted in Iran becoming a new player of the global game. The Russian president is intending to raise the arms embargo to Iran – this evidences that Moscow feels the delicacy about this issue. How do you imagine Iran’s prospects in the global and regional game?
Iran is rather complicated for external comprehension. I have recently been there and I can tell you that no one there is sure about anything either. Even if there are any expectations they are quite overstated. Yet Iran and West are experiencing diplomatic meltdown – this is a lengthy process. Even if there is an agreement signed in June I don’t think it will instantly lift all the sanctions. If no agreements are signed in June the whole negotiation process will not appear to be a failure either. In other words, both Moscow and Russia realize that despite its slowness there is this diplomatic meltdown between the West and Iran. The logical end of this process will result in serious changes both in the region and in Armenia. There are no political problems between Armenia and Iran but there are still financial ones. Iran’s relations with the world around are too constrained. The endless statements on exporting cheap gas to Armenia are made for housewives and constantly excited members of civil society. The reality is that Iran is constrained by the sanctions, including those regarding its financial system. Iran will be freer to work with Armenia and other countries if the sanctions are lifted. I believe this process will be slow but steady.