Wednesday, September 2 2015 05:48

 In an online interview with ArmInfo organized by "Region" Research Center by Konstantin Kazenin, Researcher, Gaidar Institute and the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration is discussing the situation in the North Caucasus, external threats to the stability in the region, problems with Azerbaijan, perspectives of engagement of the region in the IS activities. 

 The North Caucasus is traditionally considered as a weak point of Russia, which is mostly subject to the external influence. Does the situation change in connection with the recent trends in the foreign policy of Moscow?

I would say that the main change is related to the media situation around North Caucasus and population of the place. With the re-start of the Ukrainian events the North Caucasus has ceased to be the subject of priority attention of the media, a permanent and basically meaningless debates on TV, alarmist statements of various public figures. This doesn't mean that it completely stopped, but it became less, and in any case it is good, although, of course, less noise around the problems does not mean that these problems are solved. As to the relation of the situation in the North Caucasus with the external influence, I having spent a lot of time in the North Caucasus countries in field research, I think the attention to this instance disproportionate. In general, the situation is typical for the post-Soviet area. The striving to discuss any country or territory across the globe, in the framework of global political processes, without having any professional study of what is happening " inside," resembles the conversations "pique vests" of famous Ilf and Petrov.

 Do you think that the matter of external influence on this region is secondary?

 This does not mean that foreign policy should be forgotten, but, in my view, a serious conversation about the North Caucasus, though, should start with the fact that this region, especially the eastern part, in the last decade has been the scene of large-scale and very painful social changes. The massive urbanization, mass moving to the cities, noting that the population of Makhachkala during 25 years has grown more than three times. The implication of this, in his opinion is the breaking of the rural lifestyle, the usual system of relations, informal rules of acting in society. And at the same time of the break-up of urban life, which was prior to the mass migration from the countryside to the cities. This tectonic social changes inevitably generates tremendous social tensions, and through it - and the emergence of radical ideologies.  Yes, there are some external players, who make use of it, but this is a consequence. It is clear that no radical preacher, even if he is an agent at least five countries at the same time, can not draw anyone on his side if there is no demand for radical ideas in any part of society. Therefore, in order to understand what is happening in the North Caucasus, as well as in any other territory, located objectively "at risk zone", we must first of all speak of, the internal processes and problems. Foreign players, of course, can aggravate somehow play with the situation, but they are not the ones to create them.

 One of the active players in the North Caucasus is Ankara, which currently is generally  busy with settlement of the internal government crisis. Do you see in this regard preconditions for increasing of the influence of Iran after withdrawal of sanction  in this pro-Russian region?

 Currently, I see no exact technology, according to which Turkey or Iran could have built up their influence in the North Caucasus. As early as in the 1990s, Turkey was building its actions in the post-Soviet space through the support of national movements of Turkic nations. But today it would be extremely hard for Turkey to do it in the North Caucasus. Several Turkic ethnic groups of the North Caucasus have rather active public organizations. First of all, the matter concerns Kumyks in Degestan and Balkars in Kabardino-Balkaria. Firstly, they are currently focused on local problems and it is rather hard for them to immediately switch to the ideas of Great Turan or something like that. And secondly, opposing the regional authorities, these organizations and their activists stress their loyalty to the federal authorities. Therefore, they will hardly be interested in playing into Ankara's hands. As regards Iran, it is perceived in the North Caucasus first of all as a Shia power, and the Islam streams, which are now increasing their influence in the North Caucasus, are far from being Shia streams. As for the economic presence of Turkey and Iran in the North Caucasus, it is obviously insufficient to transform into something political.

 Thousands of Azerbaijani tourists prefer to go to Russia via bypassing route through Georgia and "Lars" checkpoint, bypassing Azerbaijan-Dagestan border, citing the unfriendly attitude of the Lezgins. What are the grounds for unfrendliness of the Russian citizens to the Southern neighbors and how it conforms to the interests of Russia? 

 I presume that the reasons for rejection of" Derbent transit" is firstly based on the information gained from the media about the general insecure situation in Dagestan, and secondly, to the memories of the difficulties to overcome at the checkpoints on the Russian-Azerbaijani border in the early post-Soviet years. However, these memories have not prevented a significant number of citizens of Azerbaijan to travel to Makhachkala for favorable car trade after the December collapse of the Ruble.  According to his estimates, the situation in these areas is better, although it is far from being ideal. As regards the “unfriendly” attitude of the Lezgins to Azerbaijanians" is based on the statements of Azerbaijani mass media of 90-s. I cannot refer to any sociological investigations, but I would speak of what I personally see: the young and active citizens of the southern Dagestan have keen interest in what is happening in Azerbaijan, many of them are visiting the country on a regular basis, not only in the areas inhabited by their countrymen Lezgins, they note the changes, considering options for business cooperation. Complications that occurred in 90-s moved the cross-border relations to a very bad" track ", but the younger generation, as far as I can judge, is not keen to follow that track further. Although there are, of course, the objective problems, for example, the problem of Samur water.

 2,000 out of about 20 million Russian Muslims, including those living in the republics of the North Caucasus, have joined the Islamic State. Can we qualify this as a possible threat to Russia from IS side?   

 Non-traditional" Islam that implies Islamic groups, which are not loyal to the regional religious departments of Muslims, has a significant influence on the life of some Muslim regions of Russia, especially Dagestan, though its active supporters make up a low percentage of the population. The terrorist ISIS supporters constitute no majority even among the non-traditional Muslims, they are intensively fighting for influence among them. So, one cannot help considering the Islamic State a real threat to Russia.